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The Editorial on the Research Topic
From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought
Normative rules and regulations are everywhere we turn; they are, as Searle (2005) memorably
called them, the glue that holds human society together. We stop at red lights and try (not always
very successfully) to be fair and truthful in our personal and professional lives. We humans are the
only species that internalizes normative rules (Carruthers, 2006), and feels shame and guilt when
we violate them. Moreover, we humans are the only species capable of creating novel norms from
scratch (Elqayam et al., 2015)—a species-specific, generative capacity no less extraordinary than
the much-celebrated generative capacity to create novel sentences. It is not surprising, then, that
normative rules feature so prominently in much of the psychology of higher mental processing—
reasoning, decision making, and moral judgment. Normative rules dominate much of the great
rationality debate, mainly in the form of the striking normative-descriptive gap (Stanovich andWest,
2000). Human behavior often deviates from formal standards of rationality, such as classical logic
and probability theory.
Can humans be said to be rational at all? The answer depends on whom you ask. Meliorists
(Stanovich and West, 2000; Ariely, 2009; Kahneman, 2011) see the normative-descriptive gap as
formidable, and a high level of human rationality as a rare phenomenon. From this viewpoint, being
highly rational is like being a concert pianist—a great achievement and an unusual one. However,
human rationality is amenable to education, and part of the Meliorist mission is to suggest how
it might be improved. In contrast, Panglossians (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Gladwell, 2007; Oaksford
and Chater, 2009) see human rationality as a built-in evolutionary toolkit. Being rational, in this
viewpoint, is the default—most of us are rational by dint of being human, just as most of us can all
see and walk. If there is a gap between human behavior and any particular normative system, it is
the normative system that is usually at fault.
As conflicting as they seem, Panglossianism and Meliorism nevertheless share some common
ground. Both positions are normativist: They accept that rationality is measured by conformity
to certain normative standards, while disagreeing, at least to an extent, on what those standards
are, and how far the conformity exists. It is easy to see that identifying which normative standard
is the right one would have far-reaching consequences for the Panglossians vs. Meliorists debate.
Some normative standards may fit human behavior better than others, decreasing the normative-
descriptive gap. In particular, the proponents of Bayesian rationality (Oaksford and Chater, 1998,
2007, 2009) suggested that probabilistic norms might provide a better fit to human rationality than
norms derived from classical logic. However, arbitrating between normative standards is far from
trivial. Elqayam and Evans (2011) criticized normativist theories (Panglossian and Meliorist alike)
for trying to base this arbitration on empirical evidence, and so being in danger of committing
the dubious inference from is to ought, considered a fallacy by many philosophers (Hudson, 1969;
Pigden, 2010).
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Normativist stances and practices are not, however, a
universal phenomenon across the cognitive sciences. Linguists,
for example, tend to be a lot less worried about violations of
normative rules. Indeed, a tradition going back to De Saussure
(1966) explicitly eschews normative concerns in favor of focusing
on descriptive rules of language, the internalized ones that native
speakers have in their heads. In the psychological literature on
moral judgment, attitudes are more mixed, perhaps because the
normative status of moral guidelines is far more controversial
(although see Sunstein, 2005, for an attempt to derive moral
norms from behavior).
The more recent position of descriptivism in the rationality
debate (Elqayam and Evans, 2011; Evans and Elqayam, 2011;
henceforth, collectively E&E) aims to follow in the footsteps
of the Saussurean revolution in linguistics, proposing that the
psychology of reasoning and decision making would be better off
letting go of normative concerns altogether. Instead of measuring
rationality by normative standards, the descriptivist position
is that rationality should be measured by the achievement
of personal goals. Evans and Over (1996) made a relevant
distinction here between rationality1, measured by achieving
one’s goals, and rationality2, measured against some given
normative standards. People can be rational1 without being
rational2 and often are; and it is rationality1that is basic.
Rationality1 is personal, contextualized, and relative, resulting in
grounded rationality (Elqayam, 2012).
This Research Topic in Frontiers in Cognitive Science follows
in the wake of a Behavioral and Brain Sciences treatment on
normativism and descriptivism (E&E; and see commentaries
there). In the current issue our aim was to widen the
debate, allowing more space for discussion as well as empirical
contributions. The result is a range of 23 articles from some 54
authors, on a diversity of topics from moral judgment to theory
of mind. We divided the book into six main sections.
THE STANDARD PICTURE: NORMATIVIST
PERSPECTIVES
This section encompasses contributions from the standard
picture (Stein, 1996), that is, the classical normativist perspective.
We start with Baron’s introduction of the standard picture in the
field of judgment and decision making (JDM). Because JDM is an
applied field, normative models are necessary in order to evaluate
behavior, with a view to ultimately improving it. In addition
to normative and descriptive models, we also need prescriptive
models, which specify how such improvement can be achieved.
Oaksford argues that rationality1 and rationality2 are
inseparable. By Davidson’s charity principle, rationality depends
on normatively evaluating other people’s behavior. Moreover, as
logic and probability are compatible, there is no need to arbitrate
between these normative standards. And, given that probabilistic
norms are universal, the relativist concerns proposed in Evans
and Elqayam (2011) and Elqayam (2012) are unjustified.
Hahn responds to three critiques of normative Bayesianism
(Elqayam and Evans, 2011; Jones and Love, 2011; Bowers and
Davis, 2012), arguing that the critique of Bayesian models is
too general to be valid or useful. Specific accounts of reasoning,
decision making, and argumentation provide counterexamples
to the claim that Bayesian modeling is too flexible and thus
un-falsifiable. Normative considerations have explanatory power
that cannot be matched by descriptive accounts or process-level
analysis.
Crupi and Girotto argue that what might appear to be debates
about standards in classical reasoning and decision making are
in fact nothing of the sort. Instead, the controversies are about
mapping the stimuli or the responses onto specific norms, or a
failure to identify what the relevant norm should be.
We conclude this section with Quintelier and Zijlstra’s take
on the is-ought problem itself. They suggest that an is-to-ought
argument might actually be normative. They argue that inferring
is to “ought” from “is” is best treated as a type of defeasible
inference, rather than deductive inference. Such arguments
should not be judged for their validity or soundness, but by
appealing to the appropriate standards or evaluating defeasible
arguments.
IN DEFENSE OF SOFT NORMATIVISM
Emerging from the debate in E&E, soft normativism is the view
that, within boundaries, normative models have an important
role to play in the psychology of reasoning and decision making,
alongside more descriptivist considerations. Soft normativism
comes with a moderate degree of relativism, which both
contributions to this section accept. Stupple and Ball suggest
that, as long as researchers are cautious of normativist research
biases and focus on processing models, normative benchmarks
have a role to play: they enrich our understanding of processing
models, particularly in the Meliorist context of improving
reasoning and judgment. Achourioti et al. draw on Searle’s
distinction between constitutive and regulative norms, arguing
that normative models in reasoning and decision making are
important for specifying both. The challenge in reasoning is to
select the normative models appropriate to one’s goals.
EXPLORING NORMATIVE MODELS
The three contributions in this section focus on exploring
and defending specific normative models. Markovits draws
on Inhelder and Piaget (1958) to defend classical logic as
the preferred normative model of rationality, arguing that
the developmental evidence supports a notion of validity
based on the existence of counterarguments. In contrast,
the other two contributions support alternative normative
models. Pothos and Busemeyer propose quantum probability as
superior in explanatory power to classic (Bayesian) probability.
Schwartenbeck et al. explore the free energy principle.
DESCRIPTIVIST PERSPECTIVES
The contributors in this section accept the descriptivist position
as departure point for their analysis. Evans takes descriptivism
even further by arguing that the very notion of irrationality is
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problematic, depending as it does on an illusory presupposition
that people are in conscious control of their minds and decisions.
He concedes that deviations from normative standards can—and
should—be construed as errors. However, these errors are merely
evidence for limited capacity rather than irrationality.
Two further contributions explore normativism and
descriptivism beyond the psychology of reasoning and judgment,
ranging into Theory of Mind territory in philosophy and
psychology. Iijima and Ota focus on the Knobe effect (Knobe,
2003), in which judgments of intentionality are affected
by the perceived morality of the action. E&E argue that
philosophers often misinterpret the Chomskyan distinction
between competence and performance as normative, a muddle
going back to Cohen (1981). Iijima and Ota accept this critique
and extend it further, to criticize experimental philosophers for
trying to draw unwarranted normative conclusions from the
Knobe effect. Lastly, Wilkinson points out to the normativist
stance in the psychological study of folk psychology. She argues
that over-focus on questions of right and wrong in this study
holds back research, and that more attention to the processing
mechanisms underlying folk psychology would benefit the field.
EVOLUTIONARY AND ECOLOGICAL
ACCOUNTS
Much of the rationality debate in reasoning and decision
making is cast in evolutionary, adaptationist, and ecological
terms (Over, 2003), with approaches ranging from massive
modularity (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994), through fast and
frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer et al., 1999), to dual processing
and beyond (Stanovich, 2004). This section presents three such
accounts. We start with Brase’s massively modular account. Like
Achourioti et al. Brase rejects the one-size-fits-all notion of
rationality. Instead, in each modular domain, a different type of
rationality predominates, linked to the evolutionary goals set by
the domain—such as self-protection, mate acquisition, and kin
care, among others.
If Brase considers evolutionary pressures a source of
rationality, Goel sees them as the opposite. Like Evans,
Goel highlights the role of implicit, unconscious sources of
thinking and deciding, but unlike Evans, he regards them
as prime examples of irrationality. He argues that neither
massive modularity nor dual processing accounts provide
adequate explanations for the universal biological cues that
trigger irrational behavior. Instead, he proposes an adulterated
rationality account, in which a late-evolving rational system is
often inadequately equipped to suppress instinctual, irrational
responses.
Lastly for this section, Schurz presents a two-dimensional
charting of cognitive success. First, he points to a parallel
between the normative/instrumental rationality distinction and
the deontological/consequentialist distinction in meta-ethics. In
each, the basis of justification is either a priori normative
obligation, or the utilitarian consequences of one’s actions,
respectively. The distinction, between a priori intuitions and
a posteriori success, akin to Gigerenzer’s ecological rationality,
is orthogonal to the one between logically-general accounts
and locally-adaptive ones. This two-dimensional mapping of
rationality gives rise to novel research questions, supporting
a dual account of cognition in which the selection of the
appropriate cognitive tool takes center stage.
EMPIRICAL REPORTS
In this last and largest section we present a collection of empirical
reports, with methods ranging from simulation to modeling. The
new paradigm in psychology of reasoning (Elqayam and Over,
2013), a Bayesian and decision theoretic approach to reasoning,
is strongly in evidence here. The section launches with two new
paradigm studies of conditional reasoning, both using everyday
causal conditionals such as “If oil prices continue to rise, then UK
petrol prices will rise.” In both papers, descriptivemodels are held
to provide a better fit for the data than models based purely on
normative distinctions. Singmann et al. found that conformity,
above chance, to coherence in conditional reasoning depends on
the form of the inference. They advocate the dual source theory
as a descriptive model. This contribution was awarded the Best
Student Paper Award of the Priority Program “New Frameworks
of Rationality” for 2015.
Trippas et al. used SDT (signal detection theory) to fit a
large dataset of causal conditional reasoning with ROC (receiver
operating characteristics) curves. They found that the descriptive
theoretical modeling based on the difference between denial and
affirmation inferences provided a better theoretical fit then the
normative model based purely on inference validity. A debate
follows this contribution, in which Singmann and Kellen dispute
the SDT modeling in Trippas et al. arguing that they failed to
make an unambiguous distinction between argument strength
and response bias. Trippas et al. respond with a justification of
their methods, and hold that their original point, that normative
accounts are unreliable guides to conditional reasoning, remains
in force.
Klaczynski uses individual differences measures to predict
normative responding. Drawing on the classic methods of
dual processing theories, he presents a large-scale individual
differences study, showing that numeracy only predicted
performance for participants who were both cognitively able and
cognitively motivated.
We conclude this section—and the Topic—with two studies of
judgment in social contexts. Wenmackers et al. simulation study
identifies the individualistic nature of traditional approaches
to human rationality, criticizing them for failing to take
into account social-epistemic interactions between agents,
such as information exchange. They test and support the
Hegselmann–Krause model of epistemic interactions using
computer simulations, which they argue are a useful bridge
between normative models and descriptive results. Lastly, Gold
et al. take the discussion (as Schurz does) into the realm of moral
judgment. They criticize the artificiality of the trolley problems
so widely used in moral judgment studies. Using more realistic
scenarios, both in hypothetical contexts and operationalized in
real life, they found that utilitarian responses were judged asmore
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morally right for actors than for onlookers in traditional trolley
problems, but reverse was true for a hypothetical game show
context. When the game show was enacted in real life, the results
reverted to the trolley dilemma pattern. They conclude with a
discussion of the design choices in moral judgment experiments.
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